





The analysis of desire ascriptions has been a central topic of research for
philosophers of language and mind. This work has mostly focused on
providing a theory of want reports, i.e. sentences of the form pS wants
pq. In this paper, we turn attention from want reports to a closely
related, but relatively understudied construction, namely hope reports,
i.e. sentences of the form pS hopes pq. We present two contrasts
involving hope reports, and show that existing approaches to desire
fail to explain these contrasts. We then develop a novel account that
combines some of the central insights in the literature. We argue that
our theory provides us with an elegant account of our contrasts, and
yields a promising analysis of hoping.
1 Introduction
One of the most fertile sources of material for philosophical and linguistic
theorizing concerns the semantics of attitude reports. In particular, there
has recently been a considerable amount of work on desire ascriptions.1
This research mostly focuses on providing an analysis of want reports, i.e.
sentences of the form pS wants pq. In this paper, we turn attention from
want reports to a closely related, but relatively understudied construction,
namely hope reports, i.e. sentences of the form pS hopes pq. We show that
these constructions exhibit interesting properties. To give the reader an
immediate sense of the issues, consider the following scenario:
*To appear in The Journal of Philosophy. Pre-final draft, please cite published version.
1Influential earlier work includes (Heim, 1992; von Fintel, 1999; Levinson, 2003). More
recent work includes (Villalta, 2008; Wrenn, 2010; Crnič, 2011; Lassiter, 2011; Rubinstein,
2012; Anand & Hacquard, 2013; Graff Fara, 2013; Maier, 2015; Condoravdi & Lauer,
2016; Pearson, 2016; Drucker, 2017; Grano, 2017; Phillips-Brown, 2018; Blumberg, 2018;
Blumberg & Holgúın, 2019; Jerzak, 2019; Pasternak, 2019; Phillips-Brown, Forthcoming).
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Coins: Two fair coins will be flipped, and Bill’s reckless brother
has made the following bet on Bill’s behalf. If both coins land
heads, Bill will be given $400; if the first lands heads and the
second lands tails, Bill will be given $300; if the first lands tails
and the second heads, Bill will have to pay $300; and if both
land tails, Bill will have to pay $400. In short, the payoffs are as
follows: HH = $400, HT = $300, TH = -$300, TT = -$400.
Our discussion focuses on two contrasts. First, there is the contrast between
(1a) and (1b):
(1) a. Bill hopes the coins land HH.
b. # Bill hopes the coins land HT.
(1a) is acceptable in this scenario. This is perhaps to be expected, given
that HH is the best outcome, and there is no bar to hoping for what’s best.
By contrast, (1b) is unacceptable (as indicated by the ‘#’ preceding the
example). Now the coins landing HT is in some sense a good outcome, since
if this happens Bill will be given $300, which is only $100 less than the best
outcome. But the contrast shows that this isn’t sufficient for HT to be the
target of Bill’s hopes. That is, merely good outcomes can’t be hoped true.
Let’s call this the positive contrast.
The second contrast concerns the difference between (2a) and (2b) in con-
text:
(2) a. Bill hopes the coins don’t land TT.
b. # Bill hopes the coins don’t land HT.
(2a) is acceptable. This isn’t too surprising given that TT is the worst
outcome, and there is no bar to hoping that what’s worst doesn’t occur. By
contrast, (2b) is infelicitous. Intuitively, this is because, as remarked above,
HT is a good outcome; it isn’t appropriate to hope that good outcomes don’t
obtain. Let’s call this the negative contrast.
The existing literature on desire is dominated by two sorts of accounts: (i)
theories that analyze desire in terms of a subjective preference ordering over
possibilities (von Fintel, 1999; Crnič, 2011); and (ii) decision-theoretic anal-
yses that tie the desirability of a proposition to its expected value (Levinson,
2003; Lassiter, 2011; Phillips-Brown, Forthcoming). We show that accounts
of hoping based on existing theories of desire cannot explain the constella-
tion of judgments presented above. More specifically, ordering-based the-
ories can’t explain the negative contrast, while decision-theoretic accounts
can’t explain the positive contrast.
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We develop a novel theory of hoping that can capture both contrasts. Our
account combines some of the central insights from the existing literature
on desire. More specifically, we propose that both a subjective preference
ordering and a notion of expected value are relevant for the evaluation of
hope reports. Roughly, on our account pS hopes pq is true only if (i) the most
preferred entities in S’s preference ordering entail p, and (ii) the expected
value of p is sufficiently high, e.g. it is greater than the expected value of ¬p.2
As we discuss, this general idea requires some refinement, but the resulting
proposal is elegant and is able to explain the pattern of judgments in (1)
and (2). More specifically, (1b) is predicted to be false, since although HT
has higher expected value than ¬HT, HT isn’t the most preferred outcome
(which is HH). And (2b) is also predicted to be false, since although the
most preferred outcome entails that the coins don’t land HT, as we’ve just
remarked, HT has higher expected value than ¬HT.
The paper is structured as follows. In §2 we show that existing proposals
can’t explain our contrasts. Then in §3 we develop our hybrid semantics
in several stages. §4 responds to a challenge from abominable conjunctions
for desire raised by von Fintel (1999). Finally, §5 concludes by comparing
hoping with some other desiderative attitudes, namely wanting and wishing.
2 Existing accounts
In this section, we consider how some existing approaches to desire fare with
respect to our target contrasts. As mentioned above, the literature is dom-
inated by two sorts of accounts: (i) theories that analyze desire in terms of
subjective preference orderings, and (ii) decision-theoretic analyses that tie
the desirability of a proposition to its expected value. We consider paradig-
matic instances of each of these approaches: the ordering-based analysis of
von Fintel (1999) (§2.1), and the decision-theoretic semantics of Levinson
(2003) (§2.2).3 We argue that neither theory provides a satisfying account
of our judgments in the Coins scenario.
2We let ‘S’ range over the names of agents and let ‘S ’ range over the corresponding
agents denoted by ‘S’. Similarly, we let ‘p’ range over the logical forms of proposition-
denoting strings and let ‘p’ range over the corresponding propositions denoted by ‘p’.
3The theories of hope inspired by von Fintel and Levinson that we consider below can
be seen to be ways of implementing the desire component of what has been dubbed the
“Standard Account” of hoping in the philosophical literature on desire (Downie, 1963; Day,
1969; Meirav, 2009; Bloeser & Stahl, 2017). The Standard Account factors hoping into
desire and a doxastic component. We discuss the doxastic component, which is typically
glossed as belief in the possibility of the thing being hoped for, in §3.2.
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2.1 von Fintel’s (1999) account
In a tradition that begins with Hintikka (1962), many attitude verbs are
given a quantificational semantics involving a lexically-determined accessi-
bility relation. For instance, relative to a world w, ‘believe’ denotes a relation
that holds between an agent S and a proposition p just in case every world
compatible with S ’s beliefs in w is one in which p is true, i.e. every world
in S’s belief set, denoted Doxw,S , is a p-world. von Fintel treats ‘want’ sim-
ilarly, i.e. as a function such that ‘Bill wants Ann to leave’ is true at world
w just in case every world that conforms to what Bill desires in w—every
world in Bill’s desire set in w—is one where Ann leaves.
von Fintel puts constraints on which worlds can appear in a subject’s desire
set. He assumes that a subject’s desires generate a preference ordering over
possible worlds: for any subject S : w′ >S,w w
′′ iff w′ is more desirable to S
than w′′ in w. >S,w is a strict partial order. The idea is that the subject’s
desire set is constrained by their beliefs: the subject’s desire set is comprised
of all and only their top-ranked belief worlds, as ordered by >S,w.
Specification of Desire Set
For any subject S and world w : S ’s desire set Bulw,S = {w′ ∈
Doxw,S | ¬∃w′′ ∈ Doxw,S such that w′′ >w,S w′}
von Fintel’s account of ‘want’ can be expressed as follows:4,5
von Fintel’s semantics for want
pS wants pq is true in w iff Bulw,S ⊆ p.
As mentioned in §1, hope reports have been given relatively little attention
in the literature on desire ascriptions. In particular, although von Fintel
provides an entry for ‘want’, he doesn’t explicitly provide a semantics for
‘hope’. So, the entry for ‘hope’ that we consider below isn’t technically
proposed by von Fintel. That said, we take this entry to to be the most
obvious way of applying von Fintel’s account to hope reports. For simplicity,
we will often attribute this entry directly to him, e.g. we’ll say ‘von Fintel’s
semantics for hope’ rather than ‘the most natural von Fintel-style semantics
for hope’. Hopefully this practice will not engender any confusion.
Now for the entry itself:
4von Fintel also maintains that want reports carry a presupposition to the effect that
the subject neither believes the prejacent nor the negation of the prejacent. We will return
to the relationship between desire and belief in §3.2.
5von Fintel’s theory is particularly influential among linguists. See, e.g. (Crnič, 2011;
Rubinstein, 2012; Pasternak, 2019).
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von Fintel’s semantics for hope
pS hopes pq is true in w iff Bulw,S ⊆ p.
In the Coins scenario, Bill’s belief set is comprised of four worlds:
DoxBill = {wHH, wHT, wTH, wTT}
Recall that the payoffs are HH = $400, HT = $300, TH = -$300, and TT
= -$400. Thus, Bill’s preference ordering over these worlds looks as follows:
wHH >Bill wHT >Bill wTH >Bill wTT
Since, wHH is the top-ranked world, we have:
BulBill = {wHH}.
Now let us consider our central observations from §1. First, we have the
positive contrast:
(1a) Bill hopes the coins land HH.
(1b) # Bill hopes the coins land HT.
von Fintel’s entry can explain the difference here. (1a) is predicted to be
true, since wHH is a world where the coins land HH. And (1b) is false, since
the coins don’t land HT at wHH.
However, the account can’t explain the negative contrast:
(2a) Bill hopes the coins don’t land TT.
(2b) # Bill hopes the coins don’t land HT.
(2a) is predicted to be true, since wHH is a world where the coins don’t land
TT. However, (2b) is also predicted to be true, since wHH is a world where
the coins don’t land HT either. But then it’s difficult to see why (2b) should
be unacceptable. Intuitively, one wants to say that (2b) is bad because HT
is in some sense a good outcome. But such judgments of goodness among
outcomes are not ones that von Fintel’s account allows us to make. The
theory only distinguishes between the best outcome and the rest of the
outcomes. What we’d also like to be able to do is delineate the class of good
outcomes that aren’t necessarily the best.
Apart from the negative contrast, the account’s inability to distinguish be-
tween the good outcomes and the rest of the outcomes leads to a different
sort of problem. Recall that in the Coins scenario, the HH outcome yields
$400, while the HT outcome yields $300. (3) is easily heard as true in this
context:
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(3) Bill hopes that the first coin lands heads.
This is predicted on von Fintel’s entry. But now consider (3) as the HT
payoff is made worse. For instance, consider the report in the Coins 2
scenario:
Coins 2 : The setup is the same as in Coins, but the HT and TT
payoffs are switched. That is, the payoffs are: HH = $400, TT
= $300, TH = -$300, HT = -$400.
To our ears, (3) is degraded here (and it becomes even more degraded if
we make the HT payoff worse, e.g. -$1000). But wHH remains the most
preferred world, so on von Fintel’s account it is unclear why this should
be. Intuitively, the reason that (3) becomes degraded in Coins 2 is that
the first coin landing heads goes from being a good outcome to being a bad
outcome. After all, in Coins 2 the first coin landing heads is compatible
with the worst outcome on which Bill has to pay $400.6
2.2 Levinson’s (2003) account
Now let us consider Levinson’s decision-theoretic account of want reports.
On this semantics, pS wants pq is true just in case the expected value of p, for
S, outweighs the expected value of ¬p.7 To make this account more precise,
6Some might argue that there are other ordering-based theories that can explain our
contrasts. More specifically, it could be maintained that Heim’s (1992) account is success-
ful here. The central idea behind Heim’s semantics is this: S desires p just in case, given
what S believes, the truth of p in a world is an improvement over an otherwise similar
world where p is false. Her account can be expressed as follows (Simw is a function that
takes a proposition p and yields the most similar p-worlds to w):
Heim-style Semantics for hope
pS hopes pq is true in w iff
∀w′ ∈ Doxw,S : Simw′(p ∩ Doxw,S) >w,S Simw′(¬p ∩ Doxw,S)
This entry predicts that both (1b) (‘Bill hopes the coins land HT’) and (2b) (‘Bill hopes
the coins don’t land HT’) should be unacceptable in the Coins scenario. However, there
are other problems with Heim’s proposal that render it unsuitable as an analysis of hoping.
For one thing, (4) is easily heard as true in Coins:
(4) Bill hopes that the coins don’t land TH.
After all, the coins landing TH is intuitively a bad result. But Heim’s entry predicts
that the report should be false. Moreover, Heim’s account can’t easily explain why (3)
becomes degraded in the Coins 2 scenario above. Finally, as discussed by Levinson (2003),
“insurance cases” such as those presented in §3.3 pose a problem for Heim’s theory.
7Variants of this semantics are also endorsed by (Lassiter, 2011; Jerzak, 2019; Phillips-
Brown, Forthcoming).
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let µw,S represent S’s credences over the live possibilities in w. Also, let gw,S
be an evaluation function, i.e. a function from W (the set of all worlds) to
the real numbers. Intuitively, gw,S(w
′) measures how much utility S would
get if w′ was the actual world. Then Levinson’s account can be represented
as follows:
Levinson’s semantics for want










As with von Fintel, Levinson doesn’t explicitly provide a semantics for
‘hope’. But given his decision-theoretic framework, a natural entry for ‘hope’
would be:
Levinson’s semantics for hope
pS hopes pq is true in w iff EVw,S(p) > EVw,S(¬p)
This account has several strengths. For one thing, it can explain the negative
contrast:
(2a) Bill hopes the coins don’t land TT.
(2b) # Bill hopes the coins don’t land HT.



















A routine exercise confirms that EVBill(¬TT ) > EVBill(TT ). Thus, (2a)
is predicted to be true. By contrast, it can be verified that the expected
value of the coins landing HT is greater than the expected value of them
not landing HT, i.e. EVBill(HT ) > EVBill(¬HT ). So, (2b) is predicted to
be false.
This semantics also explains why (3) (‘Bill hopes that the first coin lands
heads’) starts sounding worse as the HT payoff decreases, e.g. in the Coins
2 scenario (repeated from above):
Coins 2 : The setup is the same as in Coins, but the HT and TT
payoffs are switched. That is, the payoffs are: HH = $400, TT
= $300, TH = -$300, HT = -$400.
In the Coins scenario, the expected value of the first coin landing
heads is greater than the expected value of the first coin landing tails,
i.e. EVBill(first coin lands heads) > EVBill(first coin lands tails). How-
ever, as the HT payoff decreases, the expected value of the first coin
landing heads decreases as well. Indeed, it can be checked that
EVBill(first coin lands heads) 6> EVBill(first coin lands tails) in the Coins 2
scenario, so (3) is predicted to be false there. In general, Levinson’s account
provides us with a fairly natural way of distinguishing between good and
bad outcomes in terms of expected value.
Unfortunately, this account makes the wrong prediction when it comes to
the positive contrast:
(1a) Bill hopes the coins land HH.
(1b) # Bill hopes the coins land HT.
It can be checked that EVBill(HH) > EVBill(¬HH). Thus, the account
predicts that (1a) should be true. But as noted above, EVBill(HT ) >
EVBill(¬HT ). So, (1b) is also predicted to be true. As mentioned in §1,
this is the wrong result: one can’t hope for an outcome that is good, but
not best.
To sum up, we have argued that existing accounts of desire fail to provide
us with an adequate analysis of hoping. Essentially, ordering-based theories
don’t allow us to identify good outcomes that aren’t best. On the other hand,
decision-theoretic accounts allow us to delineate the class of good outcomes
that aren’t necessarily best, but they don’t allow the best outcomes to play
a role. The correct account of hoping should both allow us to identify the
good outcomes, and allow us to identify which outcomes are best. In the
next section, we develop a semantics that has these properties.
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3 A hybrid semantics
In this section, we present our positive proposal in several stages. First,
we provide a basic entry that captures the central features of our account
(§3.1). Then we discuss the relationship between hoping and believing pos-
sible (§3.2). Finally, we suggest that the preference ordering should be taken
to range over propositions rather than worlds (§3.3).
3.1 The basic proposal
The key idea on our account is that both the best outcomes and the expected
value of the prejacent are relevant for evaluating a hope report. A simple way
of achieving this is to combine von Fintel and Levinson’s truth conditions
from §2:
Account 1
pS hopes pq is true relative to w iff
(i) Bulw,S ⊆ p; and
(ii) EVw,S(p) > EVw,S(¬p)
That is, pS hopes pq is true just in case every world in S’s desire set is a
p-world and the expected value of p, for S, is greater than the expected
value of ¬p.
It should be fairly easy to see that this account explains our target contrasts:
(1a) Bill hopes the coins land HH.
(1b) # Bill hopes the coins land HT.
(2a) Bill hopes the coins don’t land TT.
(2b) # Bill hopes the coins don’t land HT.
Since both von Fintel and Levinson’s account predict that (1a) and (2b)
should be true in Coins, Account 1 predicts they should be true as well.
Since von Fintel’s account predicts that (1b) should be false, Account 1
predicts it should be false as well. And since Levinson’s account predicts
that (2b) should be false, Account 1 also predicts it should be false.
Account 1 also explains why (3) is degraded in Coins 2 :
(3) Bill hopes that the first coin lands heads.
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Coins 2 : The setup is the same as in Coins, but the HT and TT
payoffs are switched. That is, the payoffs are: HH = $400, TT
= $300, TH = -$300, HT = -$400.
Since Levinson’s account predicts that (3) should be false in Coins 2, this
is predicted by Account 1 as well.
It is worth emphasizing what Account 1 tells us about the structure of
hoping. Ordering-based theories and decision-theoretic accounts are often
taken to be in competition with each other (Lassiter, 2011; von Fintel, 2012).
However, the ease with which Account 1 can explain our target contrasts
suggests that this isn’t the case. In order to adequately model the struc-
ture of desiderative attitudes such as hoping, the central elements of both
accounts are needed.
We want to be clear about the role that decision theory plays in Account
1, as well as the other accounts that we develop below. Condition (ii) in
Account 1 is taken directly from Levinson’s entry. We have used this condi-
tion primarily because it is fairly simple, and allows us to provide a concrete
implementation of our general ideas. Officially, all we are committed to is
that hope reports have a decision-theoretic aspect which allows us to dis-
tinguish intuitively good outcomes from intuitively bad ones. Levinson’s
particular way of categorizing good and bad involves a notion of expected
value. However, we want to leave it open that the “good news value” of an
outcome is better represented by using expected value in more sophisticated
ways, e.g. by comparing the expected value of a proposition to a contextu-
ally determined threshold value (Phillips-Brown, Forthcoming), or even by
adopting a more sophisticated decision theory, e.g. prospect theory (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1988) or risk-weighted utility theory (Buchak, 2013).8 But
these complications aren’t necessary for our main point, which is that hope
reports seem to require decision-theoretic notions for their analysis, however
exactly these should be spelled out
In terms of our primary desiderata, Account 1 provides us with what we
want. However, as we’ll see, the entry needs some refinement.
3.2 Hoping and believing
Almost all existing accounts of desire posit a close connection between what
is desired and what is believed.9 One popular constraint is the following:
8Levinson (2003, 234) himself suggests that a more sophisticated background decision
theory might be needed for an analysis of desire.
9Notable exceptions include (Rubinstein, 2012) and (Jerzak, 2019). The supposed
connections between belief and desire aren’t just based on brute intuition, but are also
supposed to play an important theoretical role. Most prominently, they have been used to
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pS wants pq is true only if S neither believes p nor ¬p (Heim, 1992; von
Fintel, 1999; Levinson, 2003). However, it has been recognized for some
time (though it is often ignored) that subjects can want things that they are
certain won’t obtain, as well as things that they are certain do obtain/will
obtain:
(5) a. I want this weekend to last forever (but of course I know it will
be over in a few hours) (Heim, 1992, 199).
b. Wu wants to be promoted (but believes he won’t be) [(Grano &
Phillips-Brown, 2020) inspired by (Portner & Rubinstein, 2012)].
(6) a. I live in Bolivia because I want to live in Bolivia (Iatridou, 2000).
b. I want it to rain tomorrow (and I believe it will) [(Grano &
Phillips-Brown, 2020) inspired by (Scheffler, 2008)].
These examples are perfectly felicitous, but they are difficult to account for
given standard belief constraints on want ascriptions.10
By contrast, there seems to be good evidence that the popular doxastic
constraint on desire does in fact hold for hoping. For instance, analogues of
the examples in (5) and (6) with ‘hope’ sound much worse:
(7) a. # I hope that this weekend lasts forever (but of course I know
it will be over in a few hours).
b. # Wu hopes to be promoted (but believes he won’t be).
c. # I live in Bolivia because I hope to live in Bolivia.
d. # I hope that it rains tomorrow (and I believe it will).
This suggests that hope reports impose non-trivial constraints on the sub-
ject’s beliefs.11 The question, then, is how these constraints should be cap-
tured. Let us call the requirement that pS hopes pq is true only if p is
compatible with S’s beliefs the p-condition; and the requirement that pS
provide an account of presupposition projection out of attitudes (Heim, 1992; Maier, 2015).
The way that presuppositions interact with attitudes is complex, and not something we
can address here.
10See (Grano & Phillips-Brown, 2020) for extensive discussion of this point.
11At least when we understand ‘belief’ to be “full belief” or “outright belief”. There is
a use of ‘thinks’ where one can say ‘Wu thinks he’ll lose’ even when he doesn’t outright
believe he’ll lose (e.g. Wu is 60-40 confident he’ll lose). When we’re using ‘think’ in this
way, ‘Wu thinks he’ll lose but he hopes he’ll win’ is acceptable. See (Williamson, 2020)
for arguments to the effect that the default interpretation of ‘believe’ in natural language
is that of full belief. Whether full belief is the default interpretation of ‘think’ is not
something we will take up here. Nor will we explore the relationship between hope and
credence in any depth, since the relationship between full belief and credence is far from
clear—but see fn.21 for a few remarks.
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hopes pq is true only if ¬p is compatible with S’s beliefs the ¬p-condition.12
In the literature on want reports, conditions analogous to the p- and ¬p-
conditions are standardly treated as presuppositions of these ascriptions.
However, the p-condition doesn’t pattern with standard presuppositions.
One of the central features of presuppositions is that they project from em-
bedded environments, e.g. from under negation and from the antecedents of
conditionals. For instance, both (8a) and (8b) presuppose that there exists
a unique King of France:
(8) a. The King of France isn’t bald.
b. If the King of France is bald, then he’s probably unhappy.
By contrast, (9a) doesn’t suggest that it’s doxastically possible for me that
Bill wins; and (9b) doesn’t suggest that it’s doxastically possible for Mary
that Bill won.
(9) a. I don’t hope that Bill wins the race.
b. If Mary hopes that Bill won, then she’s going to be disappointed.
Indeed, we detect no trace of infelicity in speeches such as the following:
(10) a. I don’t hope that Bill wins the race, because I know Sally will.
b. I don’t know whether Mary thinks there’s a chance Bill won, but
if she hopes he won, she’s going to be disappointed.
This is surprising if the p-condition was a presupposition triggered by hope
reports.
Interestingly, the ¬p-condition seems to pattern a bit differently. We find
speeches such as the following fairly strange:
(11) a. ?? I don’t hope that Bill wins the race, because I know he will.
b. ?? I don’t know whether Mary thinks there’s a chance Bill lost,
but if she hopes he won, then she’s going to be disappointed.
This could suggest that the two doxastic conditions have different statuses:
the p-condition is an entailment of hope reports, while the ¬p-condition
is a presupposition. One might want these differences to be reflected in
12If we take doxastic possibility to be compatibility with what one outright believes, then
we can see that the Standard Account of hoping (see fn.3)—which posits an entailment
from hoping to believing possible—only captures one of the two constraints discussed in
the text. In particular, the Standard Account doesn’t control for the fact that one cannot
hope that p when one knows that p.
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the semantics. However, since it will simplify our discussion, and for our
purposes nothing hangs on this choice, we will treat both conditions as
entailments of hope reports. This means that the entry then looks as follows:
Account 2
pS hopes pq is true relative to w iff
(i) Doxw,S ∩ p 6= ∅ and Doxw,S ∩ p 6= W ; and
(ii) Bulw,S ⊆ p; and
(iii) EVw,S(p) > EVw,S(¬p)
The final amendment to our entry concerns the objects over which the pref-
erence relation ranges. We turn to this next.
3.3 Alternatives vs worlds
One concern with Account 2 is that by combining von Fintel and Levinson’s
approaches, we lose some of the good-making properties of each account. In
particular, one of the central features of decision-theoretic accounts is that
they can handle so-called “insurance cases”. Consider the following example
adapted from Levinson (2003):
Insurance: Sue is going on a cross-country trip. As a favor
to Sue, Bill agreed to organize the car rental. As she sets off,
Sue remembers about car insurance, which she isn’t sure if Bill
bought. She estimates that the chances of the car being in an
accident are 11000 . But the results would be very bad: she’d
have to pay for the cost of repairs which will be at least $10, 000.
Comprehensive car insurance costs $100. Sue can’t find out from
Bill if he purchased insurance—he’s at a meditation retreat for
the duration of her trip.13
(12) Sue hopes that Bill bought insurance.
If Sue is like most of us, (12) is true: even though she thinks it’s likely
that the car won’t be involved in an accident, there is a small possibility
that it will, and the badness of this possibility outweighs the cost of buying
insurance.14
13We make it explicit that Sue won’t find out if Bill bought insurance, otherwise it could
be claimed that Sue most prefers worlds where Bill buys insurance and she finds out, since
her peace of mind in such worlds has greater utility than the cost of insurance (Büring,
2003; von Fintel, 2012).
14The way that desire interacts with probability is also discussed by (Lassiter, 2011;
Jerzak, 2019; Phillips-Brown, Forthcoming).
13
Examples such as (12) are often taken to pose a problem for accounts that
ground the semantic value of desire reports in preference orderings over
worlds, e.g. von Fintel’s account. Given such an ordering over worlds, the
problem is that in order to make (12) come out true, it must be claimed
that Sue’s most preferred worlds are ones where she buys insurance. But
intuitively this isn’t the case; it’s quite clear that Sue most prefers worlds
where she spends no money on insurance (and there’s no accident).15 Insur-
ance cases have been used to motivate building decision-theoretic concepts
into the meaning of desire verbs. For instance, granted plausible assump-
tions, it can be shown that Levinson’s entry for ‘hope’ from §2.2 predicts
that (12) should be true: even though Sue knows that buying insurance is
incompatible with the best outcome, the expected value of buying insurance
outweighs the expected value of not buying it.
Unfortunately, Account 2 can’t capture examples such as (12). Since von
Fintel’s entry predicts that the report should be false, this is predicted by
Account 2 as well. In response, we propose that the preference ordering
relevant for the evaluation of hope reports ranges over propositions rather
than worlds.16 There are several ways of developing this idea, but we will
implement it in a fairly simple way so as not to distract from our central
arguments.
We will say thatA is a set of alternatives if it is a set of pairwise incompatible
propositions. So, if A,B ∈ A, then A∩B = ∅. To illustrate, let ann, mary,
pete, and sue represent the propositions that Ann wins the race, Mary
wins the race, Pete wins the race, and Sue wins the race, respectively. Then
A1 = {ann, mary, pete, sue} is a set of alternatives. We propose that
the set of objects that is relevant for the evaluation of a desire ascription pS
hopes pq is a set of contextually supplied alternatives.17
Given a set of alternatives A and a world w, OA,w(·) is an ordering func-
tion from individuals to orderings over A. It is assumed that OA,w(S) is a
strict partial order. Intuitively, OA,w(S) represents S’s preference ordering
over A in w, denoted w,S .18 For instance, Bill’s preferences over A1 are
represented below:
15As far as we’re aware, this argument was first put forward by Levinson (2003). It has
been endorsed by Lassiter (2011), Jerzak (2019), and Phillips-Brown (Forthcoming).
16This idea has antecedents in the desire literature, e.g. both Villalta (2008) and
Phillips-Brown (2018) develop accounts of want ascriptions on which what is relevant is
the subject’s preferences over propositions. However, the way that Villalta and Phillips-
Brown implement this idea is quite different from the proposal developed below. Moreover,
Villalta and Phillips-Brown aren’t motivated by trying to capture insurance cases.
17One might want to allow the set of alternatives to vary from world to world. One
could capture this by maintaining that interpretation proceeds relative to a function from
worlds to sets of alternatives, rather than just a set of alternatives. But we’ll ignore this
complication in what follows.
18We will often drop the world subscript when no confusion will arise.
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ann Bill mary Bill pete Bill sue
We propose that hope reports are evaluated relative to a contextually deter-
mined ordering function. Given an ordering OA,w(S), the function best(·)
returns the maximal elements in the ordering. For instance, best(OA1(Bill))
= ann.19
Our final proposal can be expressed as follows:
Hybrid semantics for hope
pS hopes pq is true relative to 〈w,A,O〉 iff
(i) Doxw,S ∩ p 6= ∅ and Doxw,S ∩ p 6= W ; and
(ii) for every q ∈ best(OA,w(S)): q ⊆ p; and
(iii) EVw,S(p) > EVw,S(¬p)
In short, pS hopes pq is true just in case (i) S neither believes p nor ¬p, (ii)
all of the top-ranked alternatives entail p, and (iii) p has greater expected
value, for S, than ¬p.
To get a feel for how this account works, consider our original Coins scenario.
Let us suppose that the relevant set of alternatives is A = {hh,ht,th,tt},
where hh is the proposition that both coins land heads, ht is the proposition
that the first coin lands heads and the second lands tails, etc. Given the
payoffs associated with each outcome, Bill’s ordering over these alternatives
is:
hh Bill ht Bill th Bill tt
Then it is fairly easy to see that this account captures our target contrasts.
For instance, (1a) (‘Bill hopes the coins land HH’) is predicted to be true,
since the coins land HH is entailed by best(OA(Bill)) = hh. On the other
hand, (1b) is predicted to be false, since the coins land HT is not entailed
by hh.
Alternatives are relatively coarse-grained entities. So, even if there are some
worlds in an alternative B that are bad by S’s lights, S can still rank B
higher than the other alternatives. This is the key to handling insurance
cases. For instance, let us suppose that the relevant set of alternatives in
the Insurance scenario is A = {insurance, insurance}, where insurance
and insurance are the propositions that Bill bought insurance, and that
he didn’t buy insurance, respectively. Moreover, let us suppose that Sue’s
preferences over these alternatives look as follows:




In this case, (12) (‘Sue hopes that Bill bought insurance’) is predicted to be
true.
At this point, two natural meta-semantic questions arise for our account: (i)
how exactly does the set of alternatives A get determined in context, and (ii)
how is the subject’s ordering over alternatives S structured. Taking the
second issue first, one idea that we’re attracted to is that it is determined
by the relevant decision-theoretic notions in play, e.g. expected value. In
that case, for alternatives A,B: A S B when EVS(A) > EVS(B). This
would explain why, for example, Sue ranks insurance above insurance in
the Insurance example. If that’s correct, then decision-theoretic concepts
play two roles in our account: first, they are used to rank alternatives; and
second, they are used to formulate a requirement on the prejacent of hope
reports, i.e. condition (iii) above. Note that there is no redundancy here.
If we didn’t have condition (iii) in our semantics, then even if the ranking
over alternatives was fixed by, e.g. expected value, we wouldn’t be able to
explain the negative contrast. And if we didn’t have condition (ii), then
we’d essentially be left with Levinson’s account from §2.2, which as we’ve
seen can’t explain the positive contrast.
We won’t be able to provide a complete answer to the first meta-semantic
question here. That said, we will try to give the reader a sense of how we are
thinking about these issues. We suggest that alternatives are at least partly
fixed by the subject’s planning and decision-making. That is, alternatives
will tend to represent states of the world that are pertinent to the subject’s
plans and decisions. For instance, the way that the coins land in Coins
makes a difference to Bill’s plans, e.g. if they land TT then he’ll have to
pay $1000, and will have to forgo purchasing new golf clubs. So, we should
expect that the alternatives relevant in this scenario are tied to possible
configurations of the coins.
The idea that alternatives are related to the subject’s plans finds support
from an observation by Bovens (1999). Bovens argues against an analysis
on which hoping is factored into desire along with a doxastic requirement
of believing possible. He maintains that desiring and believing possible
are necessary, but not jointly sufficient for hoping. His primary motivation
comes from examples such as the following:
Inheritance: Bill gets a call from a lawyer. The lawyer informs
Bill that a long-lost relative has left Bill a large amount of money
in their will. Although Bill knew it was possible that he’d be left
an inheritance, he had never given it much thought.
(13) # Bill hoped that one of his relatives would leave him a fortune.
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(13) is unacceptable in context. Grounding alternative-sensitivity in a sub-
ject’s plans provides a fairly intuitive explanation for why the report is false.
The issue of being left money by a relative is not one that ever featured in
Bill’s decisions: Bill never developed contingencies around this state of af-
fairs obtaining or failing or obtain. Consequently, the issue of inheritance
was never represented by any alternatives that Bill was deciding between. If
that’s right, then even though Bill finds being left an inheritance desirable,
and he thinks that this is possible, (13) is still not true.20
Note that not every proposition that the subject deems possible and desir-
able (or undesirable) needs to appear as an alternative. A dominant theme
in recent philosophical literature is that sufficiently low-credence proposi-
tions may be judged irrelevant for decision-making purposes. Such proposi-
tions will be ignored or “backgrounded” given their low probability, where
all sorts of practical contingencies determine which low-probability proposi-
tions get ignored (Wedgwood, 2012; Weisberg, 2013; Weatherson, 2016).21
This feature helps to make sense of a puzzle discussed by Meirav (2009)
involving the relationship between hope and despair. Essentially, the puzzle
is that two subjects can have the same desires and credences, and yet one
can be hopeful about an outcome while the other despairs of it. This is best
illustrated through an example:
Tennis: Ann and Bill are passionate Federer fans. The French
Open is coming up, and the bookies have only given Federer a 1%
chance of winning (since it’s his first tournament after surgery),
20Bovens maintains that in addition to desire and believing possible, hoping requires a
‘devotion of mental energy to what it would be like if some projected state of the world were
to materialize’ (674-675). We are sympathetic to this general idea (at least if “devoting
mental energy” to a state of affairs amounts roughly to that state of affairs featuring in
one’s planning). However, for Bovens, a hope report is true only if the subject’s mental
energy is trained on the prejacent of the report. This condition seems too strong. For
instance, (3) (‘Bill hopes that the first coin lands heads’) is true in Coins even though
Bill devotes no mental energy to the proposition that the first coin lands heads. Instead,
the exertion of mental energy more plausibly concerns the background set of alternatives
that is in play, rather than the prejacent of the report.
21Many authors connect this sort of backgrounding for practical purposes with the
notion of full belief. For instance, in characterizing an ‘increasingly popular view in epis-
temology’, Staffel (2019, 937) writes that ‘outright beliefs simplify our reasoning processes
by allowing us to disregard small probabilities of error...Forming an outright belief...lets
us reason as if we had full confidence in it. This is useful in many contexts, because we
can thereby dramatically narrow the number of possibilities we need to consider in rea-
soning and decision-making’. The idea, essentially, is that one fully believes a proposition
when one takes it for granted in practical reasoning. These connections between planning
and full belief suggest that the belief requirements on hoping shouldn’t be spelled out in
terms of familiar Bayesian credences, but rather compatibility with what is outright be-
lieved. (This shouldn’t necessarily be taken to sever the ties between hope and subjective
probability, e.g. Wedgwood introduces a second kind of credence, where full belief entails
practical credence 1 rather than “theoretical credence” 1.)
17
which is much lower than his rivals Nadal (30%) and Djokovic
(25%). Upon hearing the news, Ann says ‘Well at least Federer
has a shot at winning!’, while Bill just says ‘Oh no!’.
(14) a. Ann hopes that Federer wins.
b. Bill despairs of Federer winning.
The central observation is that both (14a) and (14b) are acceptable in Tennis.
However, Ann and Bill both desire that Federer wins, and they have the same
credences in this proposition. Also, it is natural to assume that hope and
despair are incompatible states. How, then, can both of the reports in (14)
be true? We suggest that these ascriptions are evaluated relative to different
sets of alternatives. More specifically, (14a) is evaluated relative to a set of
alternative that includes the proposition that Federer wins. Given Ann’s
desires, this explains why (14a) is true. By contrast, the set of alternatives
relative to which (14b) is evaluated doesn’t include this proposition. The
proposition is excluded because for Bill it is sufficiently low-credence to
warrant ignoring. Without getting too far into an analysis of despair, let
us say that pS despairs of pq is true relative to 〈w,A,O〉 iff (i) S hoped
that p in the past, but now (ii) every alternative in A entails ¬p.22 Then
(14b) will be true as well, if we assume that A contains the proposition that
Nadal wins, the proposition that Djokovic wins, etc. Moreover, note that if
Nadal is Bill’s second favorite player, then he can perfectly well say ‘Now I
hope that Nadal wins’. This can also be explained if we suppose that Bill
is effectively ignoring the proposition that Federer wins.23
We also find it plausible that there is a temporal aspect to the way that
alternatives get fixed. Consider the following variant of the Coins scenario:
Diachronic Coins: The setup is the same as in Coins, but it is
made clear that the coins are flipped consecutively, e.g. with a
minute pause between flips. Also, the payoffs are as follows: HH
= $400, TT = $300, TH = $300, HT = -$1000.
In this context, we find it fairly easy to hear (15) as true:
22With this entry, we are assuming that despair has a comparative aspect, like surprise.
23Meirav’s proposal for distinguishing between hope and despair is built around the
following two ideas: (i) hope and despair are only appropriate when the desired state of
affairs is beyond the subject’s causal control, and is instead in the control of an “external
agent”; and (ii) one hopes for an outcome when one’s thinks of the external agent as good,
and one despairs of an outcome when one thinks of the agent as bad (228-233). We think
that (i) is problematic: it’s simply not the case that one only hopes for states of affairs
beyond one’s control. For instance, even if I could bring it about that Bill gets offered the
job, e.g. by blackmailing the head of the company, I can still hope that Bill gets the job in
a setting where I’m unwilling to deploy those causal resources. We also aren’t sympathetic
to (ii), but we won’t attempt to unpick Meirav’s notion of an “external agent” here.
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(15) Bill hopes that the first coin lands tails.
But now consider a version of the case where both coins are flipped at the
same time:
Synchronic Coins: The setup is the same as in Diachronic Coins,
but it is made clear that the coins are flipped at the same time,
e.g. John is the flipper and he simultaneously flips one coin in
his left hand, and the other coin in his right hand.
In this scenario, we find it fairly challenging to hear (16) as true:
(16) ?? Bill hopes that the coin in John’s left hand lands tails.
This contrast can be explained if alternatives are “chunked” with respect
to a period of time that is salient in context. In other words, given such a
time-frame, the only alternatives that are relevant are ones that distinguish
between states of the world within the time-frame. In Diachronic Coins, a
fairly natural time-span is the one that begins before the first flip and ends
just after it. Relative to this stretch of time, the only states that matter are
those where the first coin lands heads, and those where the first coin lands
tails. Thus, the relevant set of alternatives in play here is A1 = {t,h}, where
t is the proposition that the first coin lands tails, and h is the proposition
that the first coin lands heads. Relative to A1, it is fairly easy to check
that (15) is true. By contrast, since the coins are flipped simultaneously in
Synchronic Coins, every relevant time-span will be such that both coins are
flipped during that period. So, relative to these time-spans, the relevant set
of alternatives will be A2 = {hlhr,hltr,tlhr,tltr}, where, e.g., hlhr is the
proposition that the coin in John’s left hand lands heads and the coin in
John’s right hand lands tails. Relative to A2, (16) is false, since the coin
in John’s left hand lands tails isn’t entailed by the top-ranked alternative,
namely hlhr.
The temporal aspect of alternative-sensitivity also explains why one can
hear (17) as true in Diachronic Coins, but why (18) is unacceptable:
(17) Bill hopes that both coins land heads.
(18) # Bill hopes that the first coin lands tails, and he hopes that both
coins land heads.
In Diachronic Coins, a natural time-span is one that encompasses both
coin flips. Relative to this stretch of time, every configuration of the coins
matters. Thus, the relevant set of alternatives in play here would be A3 =
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{hh,ht,th,tt}. Relative to A3, (17) is true. However, there is no set of
alternatives relative to which both conjuncts of (18) are true: (17) is false
relative to A1, and (15) is false relative to A3.
Undoubtedly, there are further factors that determine which alternatives are
relevant in context, and more work needs to be done making these elements
explicit. But hopefully our discussion has at least started to make progress
on this issue, and helped to show that our alternative-sensitive approach
provides us with a promising theory of hoping that has the potential to
account for a fairly wide range of phenomena.
4 Monotonicity
Before we conclude, we want to discuss a detail in the logic of desire. It is
fairly straightforward to check that on von Fintel’s analysis from §2.1, hope
reports are closed under entailment, i.e. they are upward monotonic:24
Monotonicity If p |= q, then S hopes p |= S hopes q
However, our hybrid semantics makes hope reports non-monotonic. To see
this, we repeat the Coins 2 scenario from earlier:
Coins 2 : The setup is the same as in Coins, but the HT and TT
payoffs are switched. That is, the payoffs are: HH = $400, TT
= $300, TH = -$300, HT = -$400.
Given the set of alternatives A = {hh,ht,th,tt}, our semantics predicts
that (1a) should be true, but (3) should be false (both are repeated from
above). But of course the coins land HH entails the first coin lands heads.
(1a) Bill hopes the coins land HH.
(3) Bill hopes that the first coin lands heads.
As mentioned, this prediction conforms to our intuitions: given that the
bad HT outcome is compatible with the first coin landing heads, (3) cannot
be said to be true in context. On the other hand, (1a) is straightforwardly
true.25
24Technically, on von Fintel’s official account desire reports are only “Strawson mono-
tonic” (von Fintel, 1999), since he treats both the p- and ¬p-conditions as presuppositions
triggered by desire ascriptions. We can safely ignore this subtlety.
25It is also worth recalling one of our central observations from §1: ‘Bill hopes he doesn’t
win $300’ is unacceptable in Coins 2, even though The coins land HH obviously entails
Bill doesn’t win $300. For another example, suppose that Federer and Nadal are by far
your two favorite tennis players. Then if you like Federer just a little bit more than Nadal,
you can’t say ‘I hope Nadal loses at Wimbledon’ even though Federer wins Wimbledon
entails Nadal loses at Wimbledon.
20
Note that the pattern exhibited by (1a) and (3) in the Coins 2 scenario
is fairly widespread, and arises with a broad range of inference rules. For
instance, (19) is intuitively false in context, and doesn’t follow from (1a)
either:
(19) Bill hopes the coins land HH or HT.
This suggests that disjunction introduction in the complement of hope re-
ports isn’t truth preserving.26 We can also provide counterexamples to con-
junction elimination; (21) is true, but it doesn’t entail (3):
(21) Bill hopes the first coin lands heads and the second coin lands heads.
However, von Fintel (1999, 120) raises a challenge for approaches to desire
that reject Monotonicity. The central observation is that conjunctions such
as (22) are unacceptable:
(22) # Bill hopes the coins land HH, but he doesn’t hope that the first
coin lands heads.
But this is surprising if hope reports are non-monotonic: if (1a) is true and
(3) is false, then why can’t one felicitously conjoin (1a) with the negation
of (3) as in (22)? By contrast, this is easily explained on accounts that
validate Monotonicity—conjunctions such as (22) can never be true. von
Fintel takes this to be a compelling argument for thinking that desire is
closed under entailment.27
In response, we agree that conjunctions such as (22) raise a puzzle, but
we don’t think this shows that Monotonicity is valid. For one thing, as
Blumberg (2021) observes, it simply isn’t the case that conjunctions of the
form pS hopes p but S doesn’t hope qq are always unacceptable when p
entails q. Consider the following scenario:
26(1a) also doesn’t entail (20):
(20) Bill hopes the coins land HH or his house burns down.
The unacceptability of (20) is plausibly related to Ross’s Puzzle in the domain of deontic
modality which involves the observation that ‘You ought to mail the letter’ doesn’t seem
to entail ‘You ought to mail the letter or burn it’ (Ross, 1941). Indeed, once one bears
down on Ross’s examples, it is clear that counterexamples to disjunction introduction
are easy to come by. Note that many authors have used Ross’s Puzzle to argue against
a monotonicity principle for deontic modals, e.g. (Jackson, 1985; Jackson & Pargetter,
1986; Goble, 1996; Cariani, 2013; Lassiter, 2017).
27This argument is also endorsed by Crnič (2011) and Pasternak (2019).
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Uncertain Murderer : Bill thinks that there is exactly one mur-
derer in the dock, and that this individual is either Joe or Ted.
Bill also thinks that the murderer might be hanged. Joe is Bill’s
enemy, so it would be best for Bill if Joe is the murderer and is
hanged. By contrast, Ted is Bill’s friend, so even if Ted is the
murderer, Bill would not like him to be hanged.
(23) a. Bill hopes that the murderer is Joe and Joe is hanged.
b. # Bill hopes that the murderer is hanged.
c. Bill hopes that the murderer is Joe and Joe is hanged, but
Bill doesn’t hope that the murderer is hanged.
(23a) is acceptable, but (23b) is not. A natural response to (23b) would
be ‘No, for all Bill knows Ted could be the murderer, and Bill does not
want Ted to be hanged’. But of course the murderer is Joe and Joe hangs
obviously entails the murderer hangs. Importantly, the conjunction in (23c)
is perfectly acceptable. This would be difficult to explain if Monotonicity
was valid.
Moreover, the pattern exhibited by (22) also arises with attitude verbs that
are quite clearly non-monotonic. For instance, consider ‘fear’. Suppose that
you’ve just lost your job. Because you have bills to pay, (24a) is true. But
it doesn’t follow that either (24b) or (24c) are:
(24) a. You fear that you’ll only earn $10 000 next year.
b. You fear that you’ll earn at least $10 000 next year.
c. You fear that you’ll earn money next year.
Now consider the following scenario:
Fortune: Three coins will be flipped, and Bill’s reckless brother
has bet the family fortune on the outcome. If the first coin lands
heads, and the second or third coin lands tails, the fortune will
be doubled. Any other configuration of the coins leads to the
fortune being lost.
(25) is easily heard as true in this scenario:
(25) Bill fears that all three coins will land heads.
After all, if all three coins land heads, Bill knows that the fortune will be
lost, and he would certainly not like that. But by the same token, (26) is
also easily heard as false:
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(26) Bill fears that the first coin will land heads.
After all, if the first coin lands heads, there’s a good chance that the fortune
will be doubled, and Bill would certainly like that. However, observe that
infelicity results if we try to conjoin (25) with the negation of (26):
(27) # Bill fears that all three coins will land heads, but he doesn’t fear
that the first coin will land heads.
Intuitively, the unacceptability of (27) is related to the infelicity of (22).
Since ‘fear’ is non-monotonic, the unacceptability (27) can’t be explained
by appealing to monotonicity. Thus, the infelicity of (22) shouldn’t be
explained by appealing to Monotonicity either. A more general explanation
is needed. To be clear, such an explanation still needs to be provided, so
there is more work to be done here.28 But for our purposes, the important
point is that conjunctions such as (22) don’t obviously tell against our non-
monotonic analysis of hope reports.
5 Hoping, wanting, and wishing
We have motivated and developed a hybrid semantics for hope reports. On
our account, hoping is essentially analyzed as a combination of the two main
theories of desire in the literature. Hoping both (i) tracks what’s best; and
(ii) involves a notion of expected value. By way of a conclusion, we want
to briefly consider how hoping contrasts with other desiderative attitudes,
28It is plausible that the unacceptability of conjunctions such as (22) and (27) is related
to so-called “Sobel sequences” that have been discussed in the literature on counterfac-
tual conditionals (Lewis, 1973; Moss, 2012; Ippolito, forthcoming). On standard analyses
of counterfactuals, these constructions are non-monotonic in their first argument. For
instance, both (28a) and (28b) can be true:
(28) a. If Mary goes to the concert, she’ll have fun.
b. If Mary goes to the concert and is stuck behind a tall person, she won’t have
fun.
However, one cannot felicitously conjoin (28b) with (28a):
(29) # If Mary goes to the concert and is stuck behind a tall person, she won’t have
fun, but if she goes to the concert, she’ll have fun.
One question, then, is whether existing accounts of Sobel sequences have application
to conjunctions such as (22). We are fairly optimistic that this is indeed the case. In
particular, it seems to us that Ippolito’s (forthcoming) recent proposal has the potential
to explain why our target conjunctions are infelicitous. But we must leave a detailed
investigation of this matter for future work.
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namely wanting and wishing. Interestingly, although wanting and hoping
pattern differently, wishing and hoping are similar in relevant respects.
First, let us consider wanting. It will be helpful to repeat our original Coins
scenario:
Coins: Two fair coins will be flipped, and Bill’s reckless brother
has made a bet on Bill’s behalf. The payoffs are as follows: HH
= $400, HT = $300, TH = -$300, TT = -$400.
Embedding negation under ‘want’ sounds somewhat awkward to us. Still,
we detect a contrast between (30a) and (30b):
(30) a. Bill wants the coins to not land TT.
b. # Bill wants the coins to not land HT.
This suggests that, as with hoping, it doesn’t seem reasonable to want a
good outcome to not obtain. On the other hand, both (31a) and (31b) seem
acceptable:
(31) a. Bill wants the coins to land HH.
b. Bill wants the coins to land HT.
In particular, we find it fairly easy to hear (31b) as true. Also note that
if someone were to ask Bill ‘How many outcomes do you want to obtain?’,
it would be quite natural for Bill to respond by saying ‘Two’. By contrast,
one can’t even felicitously ask the question ‘How many outcomes do you
hope obtain?’. This all suggests that, unlike hoping, one can want what
isn’t best. This idea also finds support from recent work by Phillips-Brown
(Forthcoming). He discusses the following scenario:
Tickets: You will be given a single ticket from a hat. Most of
the tickets are worthless. Two tickets, though, have cash value,
the blue ticket (worth $100) and the red ticket (worth $50).
Phillips-Brown points out that both (32a) and (32b) are acceptable here:
(32) a. I want to get the red ticket.
b. I want to get the blue ticket.
In particular, (32a) sounds true, even though getting the red ticket clearly
isn’t the best outcome. By contrast, the analogous hope report is unaccept-
able:
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(33) # I hope to get the red ticket.
This points to there being an interesting difference between wanting and
hoping.29,30
Finally, let us consider wishing. We will assume, as is standard, that pS
wishes pq can be true only if S believes ¬p (Heim, 1992; von Fintel, 1999;
Blumberg, 2018).31 So, let us consider a continuation of the Coins scenario
where it is known that the coins land TT. Then (34a) is acceptable, but
(34b) is not:
(34) a. Bill wishes that the coins had landed HH.
b. # Bill wishes that the coins had landed HT.
This suggests that, like hoping, one can only wish for what’s best. Also
consider the following:
(35) [It is known that the coins landed TT.]
a. Bill wishes that the coins hadn’t landed TT.
[It is known that the coins landed HT.]
b. # Bill wishes that the coins hadn’t landed HT.
(35a) is felicitous, but (35b) is not. This suggests that, like hoping, one
cannot wish that a good outcome hadn’t occurred. In short, unlike wanting,
wishing patterns with hoping in terms of our target contrasts.
Needless to say, there is much more work to be done on the fine-grained
differences between desiderative attitudes. This area is rich and relatively
underexplored. Hopefully the account we have developed is on the right
track, and our discussion will prove helpful for future research.
29Here is another way to bring out the contrast. Suppose your favorite type of pasta
is spaghetti bolognese, with lasagna a close second. You’re late for dinner, so your friend
orders for you. As you sit down, the waiter brings you a plate of lasagna. If your friend
points to the food and asks ‘Did you want that?’, you can perfectly well say ‘Yes’. But if
your friend instead asks ‘Did you hope for that?’, a positive reply isn’t nearly as appro-
priate.
Although something being best and having high expected value isn’t necessary for being
wanted, it is plausible that these conditions are sufficient. If that’s correct, then on our
account hoping will entail wanting, which seems reasonable. Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for discussion here.
30This difference points to a flaw in the Standard Account of hoping, at least when the
desiderative component of the account is precisified using the verb ‘to want’. Although
only the best outcome can be hoped for, as we’ve just seen the same is not true of wanting.
31This doxastic requirement holds, at least, when ‘wish’ takes a finite rather than an in-
finitive complement. Note that the Standard Account of hoping is sometimes implemented
in the philosophical literature on desire by using the verb ‘to wish’ (Day, 1969). But such
implementations must be treated with care, given that, as we have just remarked, wish
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